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RECENT BOOKS
THE LAWYER AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES. By Frank E. Cooper. Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice-Hall. 1957. Pp. xx, 331. $7.50.
Some books are written especially for scholars; others are written
primarily for practitioners. This is a scholarly work of equal interest
and value to students and practicing lawyers. The author is one of the
leading authorities on administrative law in the United States. He has
combined the teaching of administrative law with active practice in this
specialized field. And he has found time to publish books and articles
on various aspects of administrative law, with particular emphasis upon
practice before state administrative agencies.
This book, as the title suggests, discusses frankly and realistically the
problems facing the lawyer in handling cases before administrative bodies.
At the outset, Mr. Cooper emphasizes fundamental differences between
court trials and administrative adjudications. He points out that, unlike
courts, administrative agencies have a genuine interest in the outcome of
the cases pending before them, and do not approach the administrative proceeding with the impartiality which is characteristic of the judicial process.
"From the viewpoint of trial counsel appearing before an agency,
the chief point is that ·he must always bear in mind the element of
agency interest. Though it seldom appears in the record, it is always
an important element in the decision."
Mr. Cooper suggests that this "interest in the outcome" may take
on even greater significance in view of the broad discretion which is commonly conferred upon administative agencies. Under the guise of "discretion," agencies may relax procedural standards, decide cases without
a full hearing, and render decisions which are not consistent with statutory
authorization. Agencies may even adopt procedures which they feel are best
suited to serve the exigencies of the particular case. "The practical implications of this truism must not be overiooked. The agencies never forget
them, and the attorney appearing before the agencies cannot afford to
do so."
From the premises of agency interest and agency discretion, Mr. Cooper
appraises the role of the lawyer in administrative proceedings. He concludes that effective representation before agencies must take realistic account of the peculiarities of the, administrative, vis-a-vis the judicial,
process. "The moral, from the standpoint of the attorney, is obvious.
He must eschew technical, legalistic arguments that the agency will view
with impatience as meaningless roadblocks on the path of progress. He
must convince the agency that the result he desires is in accordance with
the policy that the agency seeks to promote."
Mr. Cooper logically analyzes the whole process of agency adjudication
from the standpoint of effective representation of the client by his attorney.

1958]

RECENT BOOKS

137

He discusses thoroughly, and with perspicuity, the initial interview with
the client, representation of the client in the course of agency investigation,
the negotiation of informal settlements, and the various aspects of formal
adjudication, including the obtaining of judicial review of final administrative action. In this latter area your reviewer finds himself in minor
disagreement with the author.
In discussing the scope of judicial review of constitutional and jurisdictional fact issues, Mr. Cooper seems to join the perhaps prevailing "mood
of pessimism" among administrative lawyers that review of such issues
will, in the future, be governed by the substantial evidence rule or other
restrictive rule which the courts apply to ordinary fact issues. Your reviewer has not yet succumbed to this mood and believes that the judicial
trend may actually be in the other direction today, at least in the state
courts.
In support of his view that findings of constitutional fact "may henceforth be treated on the same basis as ordinary findings of fact, for purposes
of judicial review," Mr. Cooper cites Alabama Public Service Commission
v. Southern Ry. Co.1 That case involved the question whether a federal
court should intervene in the state administrative process by enjoining enforcement of the order of a state commission despite the availability of
adequate judicial review in the state courts. In refusing to permit the
federal district court to take jurisdiction, the Supreme Court pointed out
that under Alabama law "judicial review calls for an independent judgment as to both law and facts and when a denial of due process is asserted." (Emphasis added.) As this decision indicates, state courts have
not generally abandoned the principle that fact issues upon which constitutional rights depend should be independently reviewed by the courts.
See, for example, Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co. v. Railroad Commission.2
In support of his view that review of jurisdictional facts may hereafter
be similarly restricted, Mr. Cooper cites Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corporation 3 and Connecticut Light & Power Company v. Federal Power
Commission. 4 The Myers case stands for the proposition that administrative
action may not be enjoined at the outset, upon claim of lack of jurisdiction,
where the administrative process includes appropriate review procedures.
The statement by Justice Brandeis that the administrative order will not
be enforced if the reviewing court finds that the jurisdictional fact issue
is "without adequate evidence to support it," or is "otherwise contrary
to law" does not necessarily mean that such issues will be subject to the
same limited review which is applied to ordinary fact issues. There was
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no real dispute as to the facts upon which jurisdiction was premised in
the Connecticut Light & Power Company case. The controversy was essentially one of law, and the Court remanded the case to the agency to reconsider the jurisdictional issue on the basis of the Court's construction
of the statute. Until Crowell v. Benson5 has been directly reversed, lawyers
may at least contend that jurisdictional fact issues should receive a more
comprehensive scope of judicial review than the courts give to non-jurisdictional fact issues.
Mr. Cooper's book should be required supplemental reading for
students taking administrative law. It not only provides the student with
a clear insight into administrative adjudication, but also, by contrast, helps
the student to appreciate the objectives and effectiveness of procedural
safeguards in judicial proceedings. For the practicing lawyer, and particularly for the lawyer whose practice only occasionally brings him before administrative agencies, the book supplies invaluable advice and caution
against errors which even the most skilled trial lawyer may unwittingly
commit in administrative practice.
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